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TURKMENISTAN AND THE VIRTUAL POLITICS OF EURASIAN ENERGY:  
THE CASE OF THE TAPI PIPELINE PROJECT 
 
Introduction 
On 13 December 2015, leaders from Central and South Asia travelled to the outskirts 
of Mary city (south-eastern Turkmenistan) to participate in the ground-breaking 
ceremony for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas 
pipeline project. 1 The commencement of TAPI construction works is expected to 
usher in a new era for the commercialisation of Turkmenistan’s gas relations with its 
South Asian neighbours – an issue that has attracted, since the mid-1990s, the interest 
of the international policy-making community while featuring prominently in the 
scholarly debate on Eurasian energy security. The December 2015 inauguration may 
thus enhance the prospects for energy infrastructure integration across Central and 
South Asia, defusing in this sense the scepticism that has often surrounded the TAPI 
megaproject (Maini & Vaid 2013). Despite some visible, yet arguably ephemeral, 
results – including the opening of office premises for the TAPI Pipeline Co. Ltd., 
based in Dubai (Hasanov 2016a) but incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle in the 
Isle of Man (Prasad 2014) – numerous international observers have continued to 
                                                        
1 At an estimated total cost of US$ 10 billion, and with an approximate route length of 1078 km, the 
TAPI pipeline is expected to carry annually no fewer than 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas. 
The totality of the project’s gas is to be supplied by the Galkynysh field (south-east Turkmenistan) – 
the world’s second largest natural gas field. At the time of writing, the annual distribution of gas traded 
is determined as follows: Afghanistan will buy 0.5–1.5 bcm per year, while India and Pakistan will 
each receive annual volumes of 14–16 bcm. Supply and transit contracts are to be negotiated for a 
maximum length of 30 years. The pricing details agreed in 2012 stipulated the oil-indexation of TAPI 
gas (The Hindu 2012).  
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express, even after the inaugural ceremony, strong reservations about the project’s 
overall viability. 
Insofar as it intends to look beyond the issue of TAPI feasibility, this study 
holds no ambition to adjudicate on the project’s operational success. Its analytical 
spotlight is placed on the acceleration that TAPI implementation experienced in 2015 
– a process that unfolded independently from improvements in regional security 
dynamics, alterations in the project’s supply-and-demand framework, or the injection 
of fresh capital into the consortium’s funding structure. The article’s empirical aim, in 
this sense, is to delineate the political and economic backdrop against which the 
December 2015 inauguration took place. To this end, the study regards TAPI, at least 
in its current incarnation, as a virtual pipeline – an infrastructure project that “exists 
only in discourse. Its name appears on memoranda, agreements, official statements 
and press releases. But it does not materialise” (Wiśniewski 2015).  
TAPI virtuality is defined by two key features, which are entrenched in the 
internal politics of the states that host the pipeline’s initial sectors, namely 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. In these contexts, TAPI’s virtual raison d’être shapes 
domestic discourses of progress that are connected to the project’s development: 
significant “infrastructural promise” (Reeves 2017) is ultimately associated to TAPI, 
which seems to “encode the dreams of individuals and societies” (Larkin 2013) that 
live along the 1000 km route unfolding across the Turkmen and Afghan sectors. 
The insecurity of the pipeline corridor, and particularly of its Afghan segment 
(approximate length: 750 km), feeds into the project’s virtual essence by obfuscating 
its future development prospects. The elusiveness of the peace and connectivity nexus 
(Rubin 2015) links, almost inextricably, TAPI implementation to the establishment of 
successful peace negotiations with Taliban insurgent factions active across 
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Afghanistan, in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, and, more recently, along the 
Turkmen-Afghan border. Until this nexus materialises, security problems entrenched 
in the region’s semi-chronic instability will continue to pose an insurmountable 
obstacle to project completion and, more widely, to the integration of energy 
infrastructure across the Central/South Asia divide. 
It is the “closed [political] system” (van de Graaf & Sovacool 2014) regulating 
TAPI development that does however confer this project much of its virtuality. Here, 
a major role is played by the scarcity of information on construction works carried out 
in the pipeline’s Turkmen sector (215 km). As early as February 2016, official 
propaganda reported the conclusion of “topographic, engineering and survey works” 
(Khronika Turkmenistana 2016) but, at the time of writing, there is no indirect proof, 
let alone photographic evidence, of any substantive progress at the infrastructural 
level. When it comes to TAPI, it is mostly the Turkmen regime – an authoritarian élite 
presiding over one of the world’s most opaque political systems (Anceschi 2008) – 
that controls “what is made public and what is not, […] what is kept secret or 
confidential” (Barry 2013). Construction progress remains unverifiable, obfuscating 
project development in a storm of conflicting information. There is, as a consequence, 
no public knowledge controversy surrounding TAPI: lack of transparency vis-à-vis 
the advancement of construction works does ultimately strengthen the pipeline’s 
fundamental virtuality. 
It is this very virtuality, paradoxically, that enhances the pipeline’s overall 
visibility: existence in discourse only has transformed TAPI into a much relevant 
infrastructure project – one that does not need to be constructed, let alone experience 
a breakdown (Star 1999, 382), to be visible at the international level. As a 
fundamentally virtual pipeline, TAPI seems to be wielding influence only when it is 
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employed as a foreign policy tool or, alternatively, resurfaces within the domestic 
discourses of progress framed by the ruling élites of the four consortium partners, and 
by those presiding over Turkmenistan and Afghanistan more in particular. 
In Afghanistan, infrastructure sits at the very core of key discourses of 
development articulated by the Presidential Administration led by Ashraf Ghani. 
Afghanistan’s dreams of industrialisation and reconstruction are embodied in a series 
of ambitious infrastructure projects, including the Lapis Lazuli railroad, the Ring 
Road, and, in the energy realm, TAPI. As a pipeline for peace, TAPI permeates 
government-sponsored narratives of reconstruction in which three main forces – 
peace, connectivity, regional integration – hold the key to Afghanistan’s future 
development: the Ghani Administration remarked that “projects like TAPI will 
remove the economic shackles that […] limited Afghanistan during the last 40 years 
of conflict” (Amin 2016). The pipeline defines the expectations of development held 
by the Afghan population, as confirmed by the spontaneous street celebrations 
erupted in Kabul, Helmand, and Jalal-abad provinces on the day of the inauguration,2 
and the eventual proliferation of TAPI-focused initiatives, including the opening of a 
TAPI Park in Logar province (Rubin 2015) and the popularisation of TAPI-related 
slogans amongst the Afghan youth.3  
Does TAPI virtuality inform in corresponding fashion the discourses of 
progress framed by the Turkmen regime? The formulation of a comprehensive answer 
to this question, which identifies the paper’s central line of inquiry, has guided the 
                                                        
2 Personal Communication, Independent Energy Specialist, March 2016. 
3 TAPI pāyān-e jang ast (TAPI brings the end to the war) is perhaps the most telling of the slogans that 
young Afghans from the Nimruz province repeated in December 2015 at the margins of a meeting 
between President Ghani and local elders. For the full video, see: TOLOnews 2015.  
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research4 showcased here. The article, ultimately, contends that it was a very peculiar 
version of the symbolism of planned infrastructure predicated by Filippo Menga 
(2015) that stimulated most decisively the sudden acceleration that TAPI 
implementation came to experience in 2015. Turkmenistan’s authoritarian strategies 
of resource management constitute in this sense a most appropriate milieu to outline 
the process whereby TAPI implementation sped up so dramatically throughout 2015. 
This article does therefore delve into the energy-related facets of Turkmenistan’s 
authoritarian resilience, as it attempts to establish a direct nexus between energy 
policy-making and the persistence of authoritarianism within the Turkmen political 
landscape. 
The acceleration experienced by TAPI implementation throughout 2015 is the 
key issue tackled in the article’s initial segment, which devotes equal attention to two 
landmark events that surfaced during the consortium-building process, namely 
Türkmengaz’s emergence as the leader of the TAPI consortium, and the ground-
                                                        
4 As it centres on political systems that are generally inaccessible to foreigners, and foreign researchers 
more in particular, the argument articulated in this paper is not based on fieldwork research. The 
contextualisation of Turkmenistan’s official manipulation of TAPI virtuality, and the latter’s 
contribution to the energy security agenda of the regime in Ashgabat, are therefore built upon the 
observation of official and semi-official material published in Turkmenistan by regime-controlled 
outlets. More specifically, this study is based on the systematic study of the complete 2015-2016 
collections of four Russian-language outlets, namely the daily newspaper Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan 
(the official mouthpiece of the Turkmen government), Türkmen döwlet habarlar agentligi – TDH 
(Turkmenistan’s state News Agency), the weekly oil and gas magazine Nebit-Gaz, and the semi-
official information website Turkmenistan.ru. This analysis has been rounded off by a series of 
personal communications – via Skype or email – with experts and media operators working on 
Turkmen politics and energy, in order to overcome as much as possible the inaccessibility of the 
policy-making milieu studied here. 
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breaking ceremony held in December 2015. In its second segment, the study will 
contextualise these developments within Turkmenistan’s energy policy-making 
process, focusing on a critical backdrop, namely the severe export crisis that has 
recently come to affect the Turkmen natural gas industry. 
Relating TAPI development to Turkmenistan’s authoritarian politics identifies 
the key policy implications of the argument that unfolds here. This article is primarily 
intended as a contribution to wider policy debates on the management of resource 
endowments and the making of energy policy in non-democratic contexts. To this 
end, particular attention will focus on the relatively surprising emergence of 
Turkmenistan’s natural gas state concern – Türkmengaz – as the leader of the TAPI 
consortium. The pivotal, yet ultimately virtual, role that Türkmengaz continues to 
play in the consortium has inevitably exposed a series of dynamics internal to 
Turkmenistan’s energy policy-making environment – a very opaque milieu that is 
simultaneously state-centred and regime-dominated. Sketching out the contours of 
this specific policy environment has to be regarded as one of the study’s key ends. 
This article also aims to address the broader debate that focuses on the 
consortium-building dynamics of energy megaprojects. This end will be pursued by 
delving into the dissemination strategies through which TAPI partners, and 
Turkmenistan more in particular, informed the energy policy community about the 
progress that the consortium experienced in 2015. Benjamin Sovacool (2016) 
suggested that transparent and inclusive processes of energy policy-making are 
central concerns in the energy security cultures crystallising in both democratic and 
non-democratic contexts. Andrew Barry (2013) also identified transparency as a core 
problematique in the preparatory stages of energy infrastructure development, 
positing the “existence of a domain of activity about which it is thought that 
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information has not yet been or might never by made public, whether intentionally or 
not”. In the case of TAPI, this domain acquired an essentially non-transparent and 
non-inclusive disposition. Technical, legal, and financial facets of TAPI consortium-
building have been in this sense enmeshed in a murky narrative that the Turkmen 
regime carried out with great intensity at both domestic and international level. By 
unpacking this narrative, this study will suggest that non-transparent consortium-
building processes tend to characterise more profoundly infrastructure megaprojects 
that are, essentially, politically-driven. 
 
2015: The politics of the energomost and TAPI’s virtual implementation 
On 6 August 2015, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Oil & Gas Industry and Mineral 
Resources announced that Türkmengaz would be acting as the leader of the TAPI 
consortium, bringing to the project “more than fifty years of experience in the 
development, production, and transportation [v razrabotke, dobyche i 
trasnsportirovke]” of natural gas (TDH 2015a). While in the hindsight this 
announcement failed to erode the project’s fundamental virtuality, it attracted at the 
time the interest of policy-makers across the wider Asian continent. The Turkmen 
regime rapidly proceeded to present TAPI as the latest, and perhaps most critical, 
module of the energomost5 (energy bridge) – an expansive infrastructure network 
that, since the Niyazov era, had seemingly connected Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.  
In the views of the project’s main supporter, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the confirmation of Türkmengaz’s leadership constituted a further step 
                                                        
5 Sébastien Peyrouse (2016) describes the energomost connecting Turkmenistan with Afghanistan as 
the ensemble of three infrastructure projects, namely an integrated electricity grid, an interconnected 
railway system, and a developing road transport network. 
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towards the establishment of a successful consortium, making TAPI a project that will 
“bring tremendous developmental benefits to the region” (Graeber 2015). Since 2003, 
the ADB has advised the consortium on a wide range of issues. The Bank acted as 
Secretariat for the TAPI project throughout the 2000s and, in 2013, came to operate as 
the consortium’s Transaction Advisor, a role in which it negotiated the establishment 
of the TAPI Co Ltd and advised on its incorporation (GAIL Voice 2014), steering the 
process that culminated in August 2015 with the identification of the consortium 
leader. Incidentally, Türkmengaz’s appointment to the TAPI leadership triggered the 
payment of a US$ 30 million success fee, which the ADB was entitled to charge as 
soon as a consortium leader had assumed its responsibilities (Economic Times 2014).  
The elevation of Türkmengaz to a leading position in the project’s 
implementation phase tackled Turkmenistan’s obsession with the preservation of 
exclusive control over its natural gas reserves – an authoritarian strategy of resource 
management that had long obstructed the progress of consortium-building within and 
beyond the TAPI context. Annette Bohr (2016) remarked that, throughout the post-
Soviet era, successive Turkmen regimes endeavoured to systematically preclude the 
access of international energy companies to onshore upstream production across 
Turkmenistan’s territory, with the notable exception of the US$ 4 billion production 
sharing agreement (PSA) finalised with the China National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) to regulate the development of the Bagtyýarlyk contract area in the Lebap 
velayat (region).  
This strict policy of impermeability from foreign partnerships has posed an 
insurmountable obstacle to prior attempts at TAPI consortium-building, complicating 
enormously PSA negotiations with Total,6 which had come to represent, in the early 
                                                        
6 Personal Communication, Independent Energy Specialist, March 2016.  
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2010s, the ADB’s preferred option to lead the TAPI partners (Sharma 2015). It was 
the establishment of an appositely tailored consortium that, in August 2015, rebooted 
the process of TAPI implementation while preserving Turkmenistan’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over the Galkynysh field. The newly-established TAPI Co Ltd holds 
managing rights vis-à-vis the pipeline segments located across Afghanistan and 
Pakistan:7 this company plays no role in the extraction activities at the Galkynysh 
field and, most importantly, wields no power over the 215 kilometres that make up 
the pipeline’s Turkmen sector.8 Türkmengaz, even while operating in a collective 
environment – of which it however retains 85 per cent equity9 – remains “the sole 
entity marketing the produced gas in international markets” (Ghandi & Lin 2014). 
The consortium’s production component is therefore thoroughly consistent with the 
ownership structure of the Turkmen hydrocarbon sector, in which state-concerns – 
Türkmengaz and its petroleum counterpart, Türkmennebit – traditionally accounted 
for 100% of the production. In the gas sector, this monopoly has been interrupted by 
the commencement of production at the Bagtyýarlyk cluster field, where CNPC 
capitalised on multi-billion investments by extracting, between 2007 and 2016, a total 
of 46 bcm of natural gas of which 57 per cent (Matveev 2008) have reportedly been 
produced under PSA conditions. 
If no foreign partner is allowed upstream stakes in Turkmenistan’s onshore 
gas reserves, “anybody can build a pipeline at the border with Turkmenistan”. John 
                                                        
7 The planned route for TAPI does not currently include a substantive Indian sector, as gas is expected 
to be delivered at a station at the outskirts of Fazirka, an Indian town located at the border with 
Pakistan. 
8 Personal Communication, Moscow-based energy expert, March 2016. 
9 Personal Communication, Washington DC-based energy industry expert, June 2016. 
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Roberts’s words 10  relate Türkmengaz’s involvement in the TAPI consortium to 
another specific strand of Turkmenistan’s gas policy, namely that which regulates the 
transit strategy of the élite in Ashgabat. The regime headed by Gurbanguly M. 
Berdymuhamedov continues to be adamant on delivering its own gas at the border, 
showing relatively little interest in the international commercialisation of its reserves. 
The TAPI consortium-building process revolved in this sense around the uneasy 
nexus that sits at the core of Turkmenistan’s resource management strategies: 
Türkmengaz’s exclusive jurisdiction over the pipeline’s Turkmen sector preserved the 
impermeability of the resources extracted in the Galkynysh field while maximising, at 
least on paper, their commercial potential. Türkmengaz’s prospected centrality in the 
TAPI project, rather than electing a regular commercial champion to head the 
consortium, brought forward a sort of “national champion” (Ericson 2009) that fulfils 
a set of coordinating roles vis-à-vis consortium management, preserving at the same 
time Turkmenistan’s obsessive control over its onshore gas reserves.  
The consortium’s peculiar configuration stimulates in turn a series of 
preliminary observations on Türkmengaz’s potential contribution to TAPI 
implementation. The appointment of a consortium leader has to be certainly seen as a 
positive development, particularly in a project context that, throughout the years, 
witnessed successive departures of key international players, including Unocal, 
Gazprom, Petronas, Chevron, and, as we have seen before, Total. Regime rhetoric 
notwithstanding, Turkmenistan’s gas state concern is unlikely to bring to the project 
the “breadth of experience, quality, and faith” (Michel 2015) that normally defines the 
commercial champions involved in the development of energy megaprojects (Mitchell 
& Mitchell 2015).  
                                                        
10 Cited in Pannier, 2015. 
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Türkmengaz’s involvement, however opaque it may actually be, makes TAPI 
standing out vis-à-vis other virtual pipeline megaprojects that have recently emerged 
across Eurasia. Compared to the “consortium of penniless gas companies” (Baev & 
Øverland 2010) that was expected to support Nabucco, TAPI features quasi 
unparalleled supply capacity, given the certified largesse of the reserves at the 
Galkynysh gas field. While it shares with the Trans-Caspian pipeline a fundamental 
uncertainty about “who will undertake the financial burden” for project 
implementation (CCEE 2015), the peculiar configuration of the TAPI consortium 
confers this project a relatively greater financeability. A few factors lend further 
weight to this proposition. To begin with, official statements on Türkmengaz’s 
involvement did not categorically exclude that international companies might join the 
consortium at a later stage (TDH, 2015a). An additional source of capital is 
represented by the international financial organisations, which have traditionally 
regarded TAPI as a golden opportunity to fulfil their developmental agendas. 11 
Ultimately, however, TAPI construction works have reportedly begun without 
definitive clarity on the project’s financial backdrop. 
The peculiar contours of TAPI consortium-building and the cloud of 
uncertainty that continues to obfuscate the project’s financial future ultimately probe 
the key ends pursued by the ground-breaking ceremony of December 2015. Was this 
ceremony a merely symbolic event that inaugurated a fundamentally virtual pipeline? 
The timing of the ceremony, more in particular, stimulates a few interesting 
conclusions. As it was held during the jubilee celebrating the 20th anniversary of the 
official adoption of Turkmenistan’s neutrality, the inauguration of TAPI construction 
works contributed indirectly to the campaign of international promotion in which the 
                                                        
11 Personal Communication, Moscow-based energy expert, March 2016. 
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Turkmen regime was engaged in late 2015. The élite in Ashgabat enmeshed TAPI 
progress in neutrality-focused narratives, exploiting the rhetorical potential held by 
the state’s energy industry. The policy of Positive Neutrality, according to the official 
press, established an environment of peace, stability, and development that supported 
TAPI implementation and the expansion of the energomost connecting Turkmenistan 
with its southern neighbours (TDH 2015b). By highlighting the contributions that the 
energomost is reportedly making to the stabilisation of regional geopolitics, Turkmen 
propaganda endeavoured to glorify the regime that is overseeing the completion of 
this infrastructure network. This latter narrative conforms to a well-established 
discourse of leadership legitimation that Turkmen state media formulated and 
promoted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Through TAPI implementation, and 
indirectly via Türkmengaz’s accession to the consortium leadership, official 
propaganda did furthermore intend to present Berdymuhamedov as a key figure in the 
geopolitics of Eurasian natural gas. In this context, energy policy has come to 
underpin Turkmenistan’s local version of the “cult of personality by proxy” that 
Laura Adams and Assel Rustemova (2009) saw as a fundamental component of 
Central Asia’s authoritarian styles of governamentality. Normally excluded from the 
symbolic spectacularisation of the Turkmen state, energy policy has hence become 
integral to the discourses of legitimacy most recently framed by the regime in 
Ashgabat.  
Its undisputable rhetorical relevance notwithstanding, the 2015 ceremony also 
addressed a specific set of pragmatic issues that intersected with Turkmenistan’s 
idiosyncratic élite politics. Many12 of the conversations held while researching this 
article did not exclude that the December 2015 ceremony contributed to secure the 
                                                        
12 Personal Communication, RFE/RL Turkmen Service Journalist, March 2016. 
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jobs of a number of officials working in Turkmenistan’s energy sector. The 
presidential inner circle, in this sense, might have regarded TAPI’s formal 
inauguration as an indicator of steady progress towards the implementation schedule 
set in November 2015, when a government ukaz (decree) mandated a rigid 3-year 
timeframe for the completion of the TAPI project (Hasanov 2015). The ceremony’s 
input to the stabilisation of Turkmenistan’s intra-élite equilibrium was however 
temporary and narrowly limited to the mid-level echelons of the Turkmen energy 
sector: Muhammetnur Halylov, Turkmenistan’s Minister of Oil & Gas Industry and 
Mineral Resources, was removed from his ministerial position on 8 January 2016, less 
than a month after the TAPI inauguration. Yagshygel’di E. Kakaev13 – the cadre who 
has been overseeing TAPI operationalisation for over a decade – survived, until the 
spring of 2017,14 the numerous rounds of reshuffles that took place in the six months 
that followed the inauguration ceremony.  
If speculating on the ceremony’s backdrop constitutes a problematic 
endeavour, assessing the progress of post-inauguration construction works represents 
an even more challenging undertaking. President Berdymuhamedov has demanded a 
speedy implementation for the TAPI project; his public addresses have often 
elaborated on the imperative necessity to accelerate the preliminary stages of the 
pipeline’s construction.15 Official views on the expected length of the implementation 
                                                        
13 As Turkmenistan’s deputy prime minister, chairman of the National Agency for Management and 
Use of Hydrocarbon Resources, and the president’s top advisor for gas issues, Ya.E. Kakaev has to be 
regarded as one of the most powerful cadres in the Turkmen gas sector. For his complete biography, 
see: Neytral'nyi Turkmenistan, 23 February 2007, p. 1.  
14 For the decree dismissing Kakaev from his deputy ministerial position, see Neytral'nyi Turkmenistan, 
6 April 2017.  
15 Personal Communication, RFE/RL Turkmen Service Journalist, March 2016. 
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process noted that works ought to be completed in the shortest possible time (v 
szhatye sroki), and ideally by December 2018 (Komarov 2015a). The Turkmen 
energy sector had virtually no choice but to adjust to this tight schedule, embarking 
upon an implementation path that, to date, appears at best rushed and disarticulated.  
In September 2015, Turkmen authorities claimed that local experts had 
already mapped “more than two dozens [of kilometres]” of pipeline tracks (Komarov 
2015b). In early February 2016, almost two months after the inauguration, Turkmen 
sources remarked that an “optimal route” for TAPI was yet to be identified. Shortly 
after (26 February), Kakaev informed the Cabinet of Ministers that the local 
contractor, Türkmennebitgazgurlushyk, managed to lay out no fewer than six 
kilometres of pipes (TDH 2016a). The contractor company, in late March, announced 
the beginning of pipe welding in the linear section of the pipeline’s Turkmen sector 
(Hasanov 2016b). On 8 April, Kakaev confirmed that TAPI shareholders had set aside 
US$ 200 million to fund “various studies, preliminary engineering, environmental 
design and various research of the route” (Reuters 2016a), implicitly admitting that 
the pipeline’s progress was not as advanced as previously communicated. 
Logistic uncertainty wields detrimental influences on project costing. No clear 
information on the prospected route and, most importantly, the lack of geological data 
on the Galkynysh field have to date obstructed the development of a sound pricing 
structure for the TAPI pipeline project.16  Such profound uncertainty does in turn 
translate into operational murkiness, challenging whether TAPI implementation, at 
least in its current form, is concretely inscribed in a binding chain of “long-term 
contracts, direct, long-term linkages and permanent infrastructure” (Shaffer 2013), 
and whether the trading states involved in the megaproject have indeed expressed 
                                                        
16 Personal Communication, Washington DC-based energy industry expert, June 2016. 
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“credible commitments to uphold cross-border transit arrangements” (Stulberg 2012). 
Scarcity of reliable information on construction progress questions in turn the role 
that contested knowledge (De Bruijn & Leijten 2007) plays in the TAPI decision-
making process. Operational murkiness and opaque mechanisms of knowledge 
creation obfuscate the pitfalls of uncontested decision-making behind an “overblown 
rhetoric” (Baev & Øverland 2010), instigating the systematic manipulation of TAPI 
progress for domestic political purposes: Berdymuhamedov endeavoured to present 
the operationalisation of the TAPI project as a major achievement of his government. 
The process whereby the regime manipulated opaque progress in 
infrastructure development built to all intents and purposes on the spectacularisation 
of the ground-breaking ceremony held in December 2015, replicating in this sense a 
rhetorical mechanism that, according to Laura Adams (2010, 3), sat at the very core of 
Uzbekistan’s politics of the spectacular. The grandiose commencement of 
construction works meant to dispel any doubts on the project’s feasibility, hence 
promoting an élite-dominated version of reality, popularised across Turkmenistan 
through a series of information flows exclusively controlled by the regime in 
Ashgabat. 
Regime rhetoric notwithstanding, the acquisition of direct proof of 
construction has proved a very difficult task. Turkmen state television had allegedly 
reported on TAPI progress17 but the attention that local media continued to devote to 
this specific pipeline appears to be relatively minimal, especially when compared to 
the frenzy that, in the mid- and late 2000s, accompanied the construction of the 
Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. 18  The information monopoly enforced by the 
                                                        
17 Personal Communication, Alternative Turkmenistan News Journalist, March 2016. 
18 Personal Communication, RFE/RL Turkmen Service Journalist, March 2016. 
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Berdymuhamedov regime is persistently obfuscating our understanding of TAPI 
progress, enhancing in turn the pipeline’s virtuality. The absence of public knowledge 
controversies on TAPI implementation reveals in full the opacity of Turkmenistan’s 
authoritarian praxis of energy policy-making. TAPI’s peculiar implementation 
patterns, which featured a substantive lack of detailed information on the pipeline’s 
route, share in this sense many similarities with energy megaprojects that are 
politically-driven, and the Altai pipeline more in particular (Henderson 2014). 
In Turkmenistan there is no internal debate on the feasibility or the progress of 
the TAPI project. Türkmengaz’s monopoly over the pipeline’s initial segment – 
however virtual the latter may actually be – dovetails with, and is mutually reinforced 
by, the regime’s unchallenged control of domestic dynamics of information 
dissemination. As it is to unfold within an authoritarian milieu that is hegemonically 
controlled by Turkmenistan’s ruling élites, TAPI progress will ultimately remain a 
radically top-down phenomenon, hence conforming to the definition of post-Soviet 
virtual politics framed by Andrew Wilson (2005, 41), who regarded interactive 
frameworks between local misinformed population and omnipotent authoritarian 
élites with no external constraints as the ideal context for the germination of virtual 
political practices. To date, opaque assessments of project feasibility limited project 
development to the discursive realm: the TAPI pipeline is therefore surfacing as a 
state artefact (Féaux de la Croix 2016), crystallising as an infrastructural project in 
which state power undergirds a modern, yet ultimately virtual, reorganisation of 
‘space, time, and personhood’ (Mitchell 1999, 91).  
When it comes to the pipeline’s construction, the Berdymuhamedov regime 
does not have to win over the hearts and minds of the Turkmen population. TAPI 
implementation is hence unlikely to witness the launch of promotional campaigns 
 18 
analogous to those designed by Gazprom in support of the Altai pipeline project (Plets 
et al 2011), nor is it expected to engage in performative practices addressing the 
project’s multifaceted impacts over the Turkmen territory and its population (Barry 
2013). This proposition might actually explain the regime’s systematic failure to 
formulate narratives of progress and development that centre on TAPI. Turkmen 
authoritarianism, in general terms, is affected by a sort of “infrastructural fetishism” 
(Dalakoglu 2010). Official propaganda has therefore not hesitated to glorify the 
regime’s imprint on Turkmenistan’s urban landscapes, remarking at the same time 
that energy infrastructure delivered progress to the country’s most remote corners, 
including the right bank of the Amu Darya river, once “bare hills and sandy plains, a 
land of sandstorm and mirages”, which the construction works at the Bagtyýarlyk 
fields reportedly transformed into “one of Turkmenistan’s most vigorous industrial 
centres” (Komarov 2015c). The TAPI pipeline project is conspicuously absent from 
these rhetorical narratives: an essentially virtual pipeline implemented through a 
fundamentally murky approach seems therefore to hold very little rhetorical potential, 
even for Turkmenistan’s notoriously creative propaganda machine.  
This virtuality has not ultimately diluted the pipeline’s relevance. Since the 
opening ceremony and the commencement of construction works, decision-makers in 
Ashgabat have begun to regard TAPI operationalisation as an indispensible step 
towards the full execution of Turkmenistan’s energy agenda. The Berdymuhamedov 
regime thus placed TAPI implementation at the core of its international activity: in 
mid-2016, the Turkmen president invited several foreign partners, namely Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia (Hasanov 2016c) and Japan (Hasanov 2016d), as well as international 
financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Babayeva 2016) and the Islamic Development Bank (Reuters 2016b), 
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to join the project. Berdymuhamedov’s moves reveal Ashgabat’s growing 
preoccupation vis-à-vis the financeability prospects of the consortium. What specific 
factors contributed to enhance so rapidly TAPI’s strategic importance vis-à-vis 
Turkmenistan’s energy policy-making? As we will see in the article’s next section, a 
detailed answer to this critically important question can be articulated only by relating 
the project’s virtual implementation to Turkmenistan’s struggling economy. 
 
TAPI: A virtual remedy for Turkmenistan’s export crisis  
The post-2009 evolution of Turkmenistan’s gas exports  
On 4 January 2016, Gazprom publicly announced the immediate cessation of its 
purchases of natural gas from Türkmengaz (RIA Novosti 2016a). As it terminated the 
established, yet typically turbulent (Øverland 2009), gas relationship between 
Moscow and Ashgabat, Gazprom’s decision cut off one of three main destinations to 
which Turkmenistan has exported its gas throughout the post-Soviet era. Russian 
experts, perhaps instrumentally, exaggerated the impact of this decision over 
Turkmenistan’s national security (RIA Novosti 2016b). Gazprom’s withdrawal, 
however, raises a number of genuine questions about the future viability of Turkmen 
economic rentierism. While it certainly represents an economic legacy entrenched in 
the management praxis established in the Soviet era (von Hirschhausen & Engerer 
1998), Turkmenistan’s extreme dependency on one single resource intensified 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s: in 2005, EU data estimated at 60-80 per cent the 
share of energy commodities over Turkmenistan’s total exports (CASE 2008). The 
vital importance that natural gas continues to hold vis-à-vis Turkmenistan’s economic 
equilibrium is hence indisputable: in 2014, the energy sector accounted for 35 per 
cent of Turkmenistan’s GDP, 90 per cent of total exports, and 80 per cent of fiscal 
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revenues (World Bank 2015). The sudden (but certainly not unexpected) closure of 
the Russian route may therefore impose additional economic pressure upon the 
Berdymuhamedov regime. To further contextualise this latter proposition, Figure 1 
outlines the evolution of Turkmenistan’s gas trade between 2006 and 2016. 
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The data19 upon which the figure has been elaborated reveal the peculiar nature of 
Turkmenistan’s current export crisis, indirectly highlighting the essentially virtual 
contribution that TAPI might make to the resolution of this very crisis. The year 2015 
sanctioned the conclusion of a parabolic evolution through which Turkmenistan 
substituted import dependency on Russia’s gas purchases with an equally 
destabilising over-reliance on Chinese gas imports. In 2008, Gazprom purchases 
represented 86.6 per cent of Turkmenistan’s total exports; in 2015 – the year in which 
the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as the second largest importer of Turkmen gas – 
China bought no less than 73 per cent of the gas exported by Turkmenistan. This 
dependency increased significantly across a relatively short timeframe: in 2013, just 
over 60 per cent of Turkmen gas was sold on the Chinese market.  
This is not however to say that gas revenues are rising correspondingly. In 
2015, Chinese purchases of Turkmen gas increased by 8.6 per cent on the 2014 
                                                        
19 The data series on Russia is compiled on information available from the Gazprom official website, 
with the exception of data for purchases in 2006, 2015 and 2016, which are respectively based on Lee 
(2014) and the 2016 and 2017 editions of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The data series 
on China and Iran have been elaborated on various editions of the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, with the exception of the 2009 data on Iran’s purchases, which is from Lee (2014). 
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baseline; the revenues20 associated with these purchases had however decreased by 18 
per cent year-on-year. China’s growing importance in the Turkmen trade system, in 
this sense, marginally contained the negative effects that the progressive reduction of 
Gazprom purchases exerted on Turkmenistan’s commercial balance: in 2012-2015, 
when Turkmenistan’s gas exports had decreased by 8.49 per cent, total revenues 
contracted by 12.1 per cent. Recent IMF projections paint an even bleaker picture: in 
May 2016, a routine document forecasted a 51 per cent decline in Turkmenistan’s 
total hydrocarbon revenues across the 2013-2016 timeframe (IMF 2016). This 
statistical contextualisation determines the specific nature of Turkmenistan’s current 
gas crisis: in 1997 (Sagers 1999) and 2008 (Heinrich 2014), sharp revenue declines 
were instigated by the traumatic interruption of gas deliveries while the gas volumes 
exported by Turkmenistan in 2015 and 2016 are relatively steady when compared 
with post-2011 data. 
It is CNPC’s expanding role in the production of Turkmenistan’s gas that sits 
at the core of the current revenue crisis, while the crystallisation of China’s de facto 
monopoly over the transit of Turkmen gas reveals in full the long-term 
unsustainability of the energy policy pursued by the Berdymuhamedov regime. While 
it managed to disentangle from Gazprom’s hegemonic influence through the opening 
of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline in December 2009, Turkmenistan has since 
witnessed a progressive reduction in the revenues reaped for the export of steady 
volumes of natural gas. The gas traded via the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is part of 
a pay-or-purchase agreement (Bohr 2016), which commits Turkmenistan to repay the 
sum invested by CNPC in the construction of the pipeline and the development of the 
                                                        
20 Data on total gas revenues are from the World Integrated Trade Solutions database, available at: 
http://wits.worldbank.org/about_wits.html.  
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Galkynysh field. Three distinct uncertainties complicate the formulation of an 
informed estimate of the timeframe within which the Turkmen government will be 
able to complete the repayment of this US$ 10 billion loan.  
To begin with, there is some scepticism surrounding Turkmenistan’s medium-
term capacity to deliver on its contractual obligations, which set the annual volume 
exportable to China at 65 bcm/y. A more detailed look at Ashgabat’s gas relations 
with Russia and Iran suggested that, historically, gas volumes traded by Turkmenistan 
have always been inferior to the quotas agreed at contract negotiation stage.21 Second, 
the very opaque configuration of Turkmenistan’s production structure does not allow 
for a precise breakdown of the origins of the gas volumes currently exported to China, 
complicating in turn the precise determination of quotas produced by Türkmengaz 
and those by CNPC in the Bagtyýarlyk area (Bohr 2016). Finally, the medium-term 
sustainability of current pricing arrangements between China and Turkmenistan 
remains questionable, as oil-indexed Turkmen gas delivered at the Chinese border 
continues to be relatively more expensive (Chen 2014) than the gas exported by other 
Central Asian producers (bne Intellinews 2016), and certainly more than the average 
residential rate in major Chinese cities (Yi 2013). Numerous experts have predicted 
an inevitable revision of current pricing arrangements, suggesting that China might 
request lower trading prices for the purchase of Turkmen gas (EBRD 2015). 
Although the regime in Ashgabat is reportedly not worried about the internal 
repercussions of total dependency from Chinese gas imports (Kuchins, Mankoff & 
                                                        
21 Since the finalisation of the 2003 gas deal between Russia and Turkmenistan, Türkmengaz delivered 
less than half of the annual agreed volumes, which were expected to total 1.8 tcm over a 25-year 
period. A similar failure to fulfil agreed quotas has recently come to characterise the Turkmenistan-Iran 
gas relationship: in 2012-2015, Turkmenistan delivered less than 50 per cent of the total volumes (14 
bcm) it agreed to trade with Iran (Natural Gas Europe 2015). 
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Backes 2015), the viability of Turkmenistan’s essentially mono-directional export 
policy remains questionable. And it is precisely at this juncture that TAPI 
implementation might come to the fore as the regime’s preferred solution to the 
revenue crisis currently experienced by Turkmenistan. The development of export 
infrastructure represents a familiar approach for Turkmen energy policy-makers, 
insofar as it challenges, at least on paper, the transit vulnerability intrinsic to 
Turkmenistan’s landlocked geography (Idan & Shaffer 2011) and, most importantly, 
continues to postpone indefinitely structural attempts at economic diversification. 
TAPI implementation ensures in this sense the preservation of Turkmenistan’s 
economic rentierism, safeguarding an un-diversified economic landscape in which the 
regime enjoys unrestricted control over gas revenues (Pleines & Wöstheinrich 2016).  
The perpetuation of non-transparent strategies of revenue management is 
underpinning TAPI’s prospected implementation path: at no point during the 
consortium-building process did the ADB or other actors advise the Turkmen 
government to explore new avenues for the management and the investment of direct 
revenues earned from TAPI, including the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund. 
The ADB’s reluctance to support alternative options for TAPI revenue management 
ultimately departs from good practices emerged in other consortia, and more in 
particular the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, in which 
the World Bank “stipulated that all direct oil revenues earned by Chad […] had to be 
stored in an offshore escrow account” that also included a stabilisation fund 
(Kojucharov 2007, 482). 
It is to essentially non-transparent ends that the Turkmen élite discourse on 
TAPI has come to focus on the rapidity of implementation, placing the “necessity of 
[project] realization” (Menga 2015) at the core of the most recent iteration of 
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Turkmenistan’s energy policy. The feasibility of the pipeline’s transit route, as we 
have seen, continues to be clouded by contradicting information flows. The regime in 
Ashgabat granted as a consequence some critical relevance to Turkmenistan’s supply 
capacity while designing the path of TAPI operationalisation. At the Cabinet of 
Ministers held on 15 January 2016, the president himself offered a series of tips to 
Kakaev on the options available to accelerate the development of the Galkynysh field 
(TDH 2016b). An explicit offer to partner up in the exploration and expansion of the 
Galkynysh field was also made to King Salmān ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Sa‘ūd during 
Berdymuhamedov’s official trip to Saudi Arabia in mid-2016 (Neftegaz.ru 2016). 
Enhanced delivery capacity may also be seen as a targeted response to the prospected 
revision of the TAPI pricing arrangements: India is known to be exploring future 
scenarios for price renegotiation, as the agreed price of US$ 9.17/MMbtu no longer 
matches the post-2014 reality of low commodities prices. 22  An enhanced supply 
capacity, finally, could alleviate Turkmenistan’s revenue crisis without the 
construction of new export infrastructure, suggesting that TAPI’s virtual 
implementation might promote a sort of fictional multi-directionality, 23  serving 
Turkmenistan’s purposes in the negotiations of a new purchase deal with Gazprom or 
new price arrangements with Ashgabat’s Chinese partners.  
However virtual its implementation may ultimately be, TAPI remains a 
pipeline for regime stability: its operationalisation might strengthen the élites’ 
economic monopoly, addressing in the short term the ramifications of declining gas 
                                                        
22 I owe this point to Manish Vaid, who kindly shared with me some of the results of his research on 
India’s TAPI policy.  
23 Personal Communication, Moscow-based energy expert, March 2016. 
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revenues. These ramifications, as the article’s next segment aims to demonstrate, 
eroded in quite dramatic fashion the legitimacy of the Berdymuhamedov regime. 
 
Internalising Turkmenistan’s export crisis 
The devaluation of 1 January 2015 embodies more than any other development 
Turkmenistan’s faltering economic performance. While it formed part in the monetary 
crisis erupted across post-Soviet Eurasia in 2014, the devaluation of the manat – 
which lost at the time 18.9 per cent of its value – revealed the government’s declining 
capacity to prop up an essentially non-performing currency. The revenue crisis 
described above played a central role in setting into motion this latter dynamics. 
While the traditional opacity of Turkmen budgetary accounts prevents precise 
assessments of the decline experienced by the regime’s spending capacity, the impact 
of the revenue crisis over Turkmenistan’s real economy can be appreciated in full by 
looking at two distinct, yet certainly not unrelated, dynamics. On the one hand, 
foreign currency remains largely unavailable across the entire Turkmen territory. On 
the other, the regime accelerated the suspension of a set of energy subsidies24 that 
traditionally supported residential and transport consumption as well as the producers 
operating in the agro-industrial sector (Pomfret 2006). Energy subsidisation 
performed crucially important functions in Turkmenistan’s authoritarian strategies of 
                                                        
24 The most extensive revision of Turkmenistan’s gas subsidisation system was carried out in early 
2014, when the government set free monthly quotas of 50cm per household, charging consumption 
over this threshold at 20 manat (US$ 5.71 at post-devaluation rate) per 1000 cm (bne Intellinews 2014). 
Artificially low fuel prices also resulted from Turkmenistan’s protracted subsidisation practice: Lucas 
Davis (2016) reported that, in 2014, a litre of gasoline bought in Turkmenistan would cost no more 
than US$ 0.20. Beyond energy, Turkmenistan’s subsidisation system also included “water, salt, flour 
and other goods” (ICG 2003). 
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economic management: the cost of implicit and explicit energy subsidies reached 20 
per cent of total GDP in 2010 (EBRD 2014), a 100 per cent increase on the 2000 
baseline (Petri et al 2002). As the suspension of domestic subsidisation practices 
rewrote Turkmenistan’s energy social contract, the population’s declining energy 
security may now be seen as erosive of the regime’s authoritarian stability. 
The internalisation of the revenue crisis also unveils the difficult economic 
predicament of Türkmengaz, the TAPI consortium leader. In early 2015, a 
comprehensive reorganisation of Türkmengaz’s workforce led to an undisclosed 
number of staff redundancies, which did reportedly target personnel operating a series 
of compressor stations situated along the Central Asia-Centre pipeline (exporting to 
Russia) and the exporting routes to Iran (Serdar 2015). Significant personnel cuts 
were also imposed on the state concern for exploration and field development, 
TurkmenGeologiya, which lost 30 per cent of its staff in September 2015 (Khronika 
Turkmenistana 2015). In 2016, another massive round of redundancies hit one of 
Türkmengaz’s regional subsidiaries, namely Dashoguzneftegazstroy, which witnessed 
the closure of two of its departments and the ensuing layoff of at least 2000 workers.25 
Some26 of the interviews conducted while researching this article also highlighted the 
recent accumulation of wage arrears in different segments of Turkmenistan’s gas 
sector. The precarious state of the local gas industry led to an increase in workers’ 
mobilisation, a very rare occurrence in Turkmenistan: while there are reports of 
numerous strikes erupted in 2015 and 2016 across the wider Turkmen territory, this 
                                                        
25 Personal Communication, RFE/RL Turkmen Service Journalist, March 2016. 
26 Personal Communication, Alternative Turkmenistan News Journalist, March 2016. 
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state of unrest has been particularly visible amongst workers employed by 
Türkmengaz subsidiary companies in the Lebap velayat.27  
Growing job insecurity amongst Türkmengaz workers has been mirrored by 
an endemic instability affecting the company’s leadership. The chairmanship of 
Türkmengaz has become a very precarious post: out of the last four chairmen, only 
Ashirguly Begliev remained at the helm for over 12 months.28 The regularity with 
which staff turnover has been executed at the highest echelons of Türkmengaz 
indicates that Turkmenistan’s energy policy-making continues to be a process 
monopolised by the central regime. The state’s gas concern has no stakeholder role to 
play in this process, inasmuch as it has not featured, to date, an autonomous drive to 
pursue targeted projects, let alone a genuinely independent policy agenda. There is 
very little evidence to anticipate that a new role for Türkmengaz may result from the 
reform packages implemented in July 2016, when a presidential decree abolished both 
the Ministry of Oil & Gas Industry and Mineral Resources, and the State Agency on 
Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources, thus placing the Turkmen energy 
                                                        
27 Personal Communication, Alternative Turkmenistan News Journalist, March 2016. 
28 Denison (2012, 153) noted that the rotation of senior personnel defines the intersection between 
politics and energy in Turkmenistan, remarking that élites working in the gas industry are periodically 
reshuffled around the state energy sector. A closer look at Türkmegaz personnel policy, however, 
revealed that the chairmanship of the state gas concern has recently become a terminal position in a 
cadre’s career. Upon their dismissals from Türkmengaz, all recently outgoing chairmen (Ch. 
Khummadov, K.B. Abdyllaev, A. Begliev) have reportedly been moved to unspecified posts. No trace 
of their post-Türkmengaz career has been found in Turkmenistan’s official media in general and 
Neytral'nyi Turkmenistan more in particular, hence suggesting that the cadre management practice 
described by Michael Denison may have been abandoned by the Berdymuhamedov regime. 
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sector under the direct supervision of Türkmengaz and its petroleum counterpart, 
Türkmennebit.29  
This latter consideration bears significant influence on the characterisation of 
the TAPI decision-making environment advanced throughout this article: as 
Türkmengaz is performing the duties of consortium leader, the political priorities of 
the Berdymuhamedov regime are bound to wield a key influence over the project’s 
implementation as well as on the future directions to be taken by the consortium as a 
whole. 
Türkmengaz’s capacity to execute the TAPI agenda, nevertheless, has been 
repeatedly questioned, on the basis of the very limited financial contribution that the 
Turkmen gas concern might make to the project 30  and, most interestingly, the 
allegedly scarce expertise in project management and development available within 
the company ranks. The pool of Turkmenistan’s talent in the energy sector is rapidly 
shrinking: as an increasing number of local experts31 continue to leave Turkmenistan 
in order to pursue work and training opportunities abroad,32 domestic opportunities 
for oil and gas training are few and far between, as confirmed by the drastic reduction 
of Turkmenistan’s energy training institutions that was inscribed in the extensive 
reform of the gas sector carried out in early January 2016 (TDH 2016c).  
                                                        
29  See: “Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistan ob uprazdnenii Ministerstva nefti i gaza Turkmenistan”, 
Neytral'nyi Turkmenistan, 16 July 2016, p. 4.  
30 Personal Communication, RFE/RL Turkmen Service Journalist, March 2016. 
31 Personal Communication, Alternative Turkmenistan News Journalist, March 2016. 
32 Training appears to play a key role within Turkmenistan’s gas relationship with China. CNPC is 
reportedly providing financial support to at least 80 Turkmen students pursuing energy-related degrees 
in Chinese and British universities (Komarov 2015c). 
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At large, any negative assessment of Türkmengaz’s technological capability 
and financial power probes Turkmenistan’s perceived capacity to transform its large 
gas endowment into a resulting form of gas empowerment (Palazuelos & Fernández 
2012). In more specific terms, Türkmengaz’s current predicament raises many doubts 
about the capacity of Turkmenistan’s gas industry to sustain in full the acceleration 
that TAPI operationalisation experienced in 2015. Turkmenistan’s energy sector, in 
this sense, represents an inhospitable milieu for TAPI implementation: the general 
lack of domestic expertise and capital is exacerbated by the regime’s reluctance to 
open up to external talent and foreign capital. The benefits that TAPI progress might 
bring to Turkmenistan’s real economy are hence confined to a very virtual realm. 
While the regime continues to maintain that a fully operationalised TAPI is expected 
to contribute to the advancement of the local economy through the creation of 12000 
jobs (TDH 2016c), the Turkmen official sources consulted while preparing this article 
provided no detailed information on the regional and structural breakdown of the 
employment component allegedly associated to TAPI development.  
It is hence possible to suggest that TAPI’s virtual implementation might fail to 
address even the most superficial energy-related components of Turkmenistan’s 
economic crisis. In the narrow interpretation made by the élite in Ashgabat, the TAPI 
megaproject does not aim to shape the society it is designed to serve. TAPI is hence a 
pipeline for regime stability, a non –“socially constructed artefact” (Hughes 1987), an 
infrastructure project that remains essentially integral to the regime that regulates its 
fundamentally virtual implementation. TAPI thus contributes to Turkmenistan’s 
peculiar form of infrastructural fetishism, substantiating Peter Leonard’s argument33 
that equates the regime’s perception of its own success to the state’s capacity to 
                                                        
33 Cited in Pannier, 2016. 
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develop a widely visible, but ultimately self-serving, infrastructure network. The 
development path currently set for the pipeline’s initial sector confirms that, in 
Turkmenistan, the logic of power preservation continues to leave very tangible 
imprints upon the process of energy policy-making. 
 
Conclusions 
While discussing the December 2015 ground-breaking ceremony and the ensuing 
commencement of TAPI construction works, Ashay Abbhi (2016) queried whether 
the acceleration experienced by project implementation in 2015 has to be seen as a “a 
landmark that signals a departure from history of scepticism into a future of 
cooperation”. This article has indirectly answered Abbhi’s question, positing that, due 
to its fundamental virtuality, the international relevance of the TAPI pipeline project 
is not to be perceived as an exclusive function of the progress achieved at 
implementation stage. A closer look at the policy contexts to which the consortium 
members related TAPI implementation clarifies further this latter proposition. For 
Pakistan and India, TAPI is primarily a vehicle to preserve a series of communication 
channels that remain central to local processes of conflict resolution and prevention. 
In Afghanistan, both the government and the population have continued to perceive 
TAPI as a pipeline for peace, leaving its relevance vis-à-vis local and national 
dynamics of energy security at the very margins of any policy debate on the project. 
It is with the Turkmen policy context, however, that this study engaged most 
directly. By enmeshing TAPI implementation in Turkmenistan’s energy policy-
making milieu, the article delineated the contours of Türkmengaz’s consortium 
leadership. To be properly understood, the function performed by Türkmengaz within 
the TAPI consortium needs to be related to wider debates on the contribution made by 
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the national energy companies of authoritarian political systems to the construction 
and the management of energy megaprojects. 
In the case of TAPI, Türkmengaz is offering a virtual leadership to a 
financially precarious consortium. Turkmenistan’s state natural gas concern has very 
little capital to invest, minimal technological know-how, and, due to its intimate 
connection with the logic of authoritarian stability that dominates Turkmen politics 
and policy-making, no intention to partner up with foreign actors towards the 
achievement of the consortium’s operational targets. Türkmengaz’s input in the 
consortium hence features none of the characteristics – access to cheap capital, 
motivation beyond profit, and a generally easier access to resources – that Benjamin 
Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (2013, 20) outlined to describe the influences 
exerted by national energy companies upon energy megaprojects.  
Beyond its duties as consortium leader, Türkmengaz is reportedly managing 
project implementation in the pipeline’s Turkmen sector. The opaque information 
dissemination strategy devised by the regime in Ashgabat prevented any independent 
assessment of the progress made by the construction works initiated in December 
2015. At the same time, lack of details on project development obstructed the 
emergence of domestic debates on the social and environmental impact of the 
megaproject. This article found no sufficient evidence to establish whether TAPI 
implementation is actually performed in a way that “not only minimizes damage but 
actually improves [the] standards of living” of the wider Turkmen population 
(Sovacool 2013, 144). No public knowledge controversy is surrounding project 
implementation, and TAPI remains a politically-driven megaproject operating in an 
obsessively authoritarian landscape. There is therefore very little doubt about the 
political facet of the pipeline’s overall impact: the authoritarian stability of the 
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Berdymuhamedov regime will greatly benefit from the rise in Turkmenistan’s gas 
revenues resulting from TAPI operationalisation. 
TAPI virtuality fits rather well within Central Asia’s current praxis of energy 
megaproject management, in which authoritarian political systems continue to place 
significant emphasis on the development of colossal infrastructure projects, including 
the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan and the Kashagan oil field in Western Kazakhstan. The 
virtual operationalisation of these projects participates in regime narratives that are 
respectively centred on Tajikistan’s “national pride and honor” (Menga 2015) and 
Kazakhstan’s economic prosperity. TAPI remains a planned infrastructure project 
designed to enhance regime stability: its virtual operationalisation, as this article has 
concluded, sanctioned the ultimate intersection between the energy policy-making 
praxis of the Turkmen state and the authoritarian politics performed by the 
Berdymuhamedov regime.  
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